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30 January 1958

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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25X1

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DAILY BRIEF

25X1

II. ASIA-AFRICA

no
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Syria: Syrian Communist Party leader Bakdash has clearly implied in a public statement that his party will not be dissolved voluntarily despite the fact that dissolution of all Syrian political parties is one of the conditions Nasir has set for Egyptian agreement to union with Syria.

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Indonesia: The Indonesian Communist party continues its attempts to equate patriotism with support of the Djuanda government. It is simultaneously urging the intensification of the drive for West Irian and calling for the forcible suppression of the dissident movement based on Sumatra. Surreptitiously the party is moving to consolidate and extend its recent gains, particularly through a scheme of enhancing its role in the management of property seized from the Dutch. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Yemen: The Yemeni Government has apparently thwarted a coup attempted against the Imam on 22 January. Widespread arrests have followed, accompanied by bazaar rumors that the revolt was sponsored by the British and Americans. The British chargé in Yemen and a visiting American official are under close surveillance, while Soviet officials are permitted to move freely. Yemen has requested that the British minister be recalled. [redacted]

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Cyprus: The recent disorders involving the Turkish minority resulted temporarily in a breakdown in the functioning of the local police force, 80 percent of which is Turkish Cypriot. This poses Britain with a new dilemma in terms of its relations with the Turks, and may force it to rely increasingly on the 23,000 British troops on the island for routine police activity. [redacted]

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III. THE WEST

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Guatemala: The 27 January agreement between General Ydigoras and Cruz Salazar has reduced but not eliminated the danger of postelection violence. If disturbances do occur, provisional President Flores may continue in office to maintain order. [redacted]

25X1

30 Jan 58

DAILY BRIEF

ii

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25X1

25X1

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

No back-up material.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Communist Party Tactics in Indonesia

Indonesian Communist party propaganda is trying to make the preservation of the Djuanda cabinet a question of "patriotism," and is increasingly contrasting Communist "concern" for national unity with alleged efforts on Sumatra to create a separate state. The Communist press claims Sumatran preparations have reached an advanced stage but can succeed only with US and other "imperialist" support. The party suggests that the army can and should crush any separate regime in Sumatra.

The Communists are urging continued pressure in the drive for West Irian (Netherlands New Guinea) and party participation in all Indonesian "assistance teams" which are overseeing seized Dutch enterprises. Party directives to subordinate Communist officials call for intensified activity within the assistance teams to ensure Communist control of them within six months.

When President Sukarno returns from his rest in Japan in late February, the Communist party can be expected to urge him to resist pressure for moderation on the issues of West Irian and Indonesian national unity. If it is successful, an early Communist effort to seize control of the Indonesian Government is unlikely.

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Conspiracy in Yemen Being Exploited Against
Western Interests

Fragmentary reports indicate that the Yemeni Government thwarted a coup attempted against the Imam on 22 January, when 30 northern tribesmen attempted to enter the Imam's palace at Taiz. The rebels were said to be supported by a group of Yemeni patricians and merchants and two local governors, all of whom oppose the claim to succession by the Imam's son, Crown Prince Badr. Widespread arrests have taken place, accompanied by a wave of terror.

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Bazaar rumors that the plotters were backed by the British and the United States may indicate that the Yemeni Government is trying to exploit the incident to further reduce Western influence in Yemen. The British chargé in Yemen and the visiting American consul from Aden are under close surveillance, while Soviet bloc officials are permitted to move freely. Yemen has officially requested the recall of the British chargé, but London is attempting to stall his departure. The probable result of these developments will be to strengthen Soviet-Egyptian influence in Yemen; it is also possible that Yemen may use them as an excuse for not permitting establishment of a resident American diplomatic mission at this time.

Widespread opposition to the Imam and his son flared into open rebellion in eastern Yemen last October, which the Yemenis claim was instigated by the British. Renewed Yemeni hostility to the British has also been evident in more serious clashes along the Aden Protectorate frontier and in spreading subversion within the Protectorate.

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III. THE WEST

Threat of Violence Reduced in Guatemala

The danger of violence in Guatemala over the still undecided 19 January presidential election has diminished but not disappeared as a result of the agreement reached on 27 January between General Ydigoras, who won a clear plurality, and followers of Cruz Salazar, the apparent runner-up. Cruz followers are to concede Ydigoras the presidency, and Ydigoras has promised to accept his erstwhile opponents in an anti-Communist coalition and to give them three cabinet posts.

Pro-Cruz parties control the congress, which began its review of the votes on 27 January and which, since no one won a majority, will be responsible for choosing between the two highest candidates. Congressional leaders expect the process to take at least ten days.

The residue of bitterness between Ydigoras and Cruz partisans is still strong, however, and interim President Flores may use any resulting violence as a pretext to remain in office. There is some suspicion that he may even be spreading the current rumors of impending disturbances along the Mexican and Salvadoran borders in an attempt to accomplish this end.

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
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